Sunday, February 28, 2021

Trump Speaks of CPAC-Change is Constant

Watching the political news and changes in the political scene as Trump reengages GOP after leaving office. The Republican party has been through a lot over the past year and there are questions as to where it is headed next (1 party or 2 parties?). It looks like an underlining crack in the party but whether that gets bigger or smaller depends on socio-political changes. I found this posting on socio-political changes to refresh my memory. If you read the preview page it has some cool ideas that put things into perspective of how change in society occurs. HERE. 

The publication discusses patterns of society and its institutions (family, church, political, and economic). When one of them changes they will all change in some way. For example a change in family would impact political and economic aspects of life (Have you watched Game of Thrones? From a more scientific perspective, changing factor T influences B and visa versa. 

Change is constant and change builds off of previous choices. We can project what may happen but we can't be 100% sure. Think of how society has changed in just the past 6 years and how the personalities and beliefs of key leaders influence large swaths of people. Ideas that tap into people's pre-existing beliefs create further alignment/agreement as ideas conceptually blend. There are many different types of power but....it is how we use that power that counts in defining ourselves (your character). 

Smith, S. (1968). A Case Study on Socio-Political Change. Phylon (1960-), 29(4), 380-387. doi:10.2307/274023

Bi-Partisanship, Veterans and "For Country Caucus"?

Veterans are a motivated group who know the deeper meaning of patriotism. They have walked the talk and often come back home and would like to engage in their communities and government in a meaningful way. Bi-partisanship and the need for veterans to once again serve their country through pro-social and positive community growth and action. When given half a chance, many veterans continue to serve for lifetimes after service. As a group they can put their experiences and knowledge in creating national development policies.

Bergman Joins Bipartisan For Country Caucus
Washington - The For Country Caucus, a group of Military Veterans serving in Congress and dedicated to working together to create a more productive government, announced new leadership and a growing caucus membership for the 117th Congress. A retired Lt. General in the Marine Corps, U.S. Representative Jack Bergman will join the Caucus for the 117th Congress.

“With forty years serving in the United States Marines Corps and earning the rank of Lt. General, Congressman Jack Bergman is the highest-ranking combat Veteran to have ever served in the House of Representatives and I am honored to have him join the For Country Caucus. Rep. Bergman’s vast military experience will be a tremendous asset to our group,” said Republican Co-Chair of the For Country Caucus, Congressman Van Taylor.

“I’m proud to be a member of the bipartisan For Country Caucus. Far too often the strong, bipartisan work done every day in D.C. is drowned out by the noise of partisan bickering. This caucus, comprised of men and women who have served in our Nation’s uniform, will continue to focus on policy to better our communities and country as whole,” said Rep. Bergman.

Congressmen Van Taylor (R-TX-03) and Jared Golden (D-ME-02) will lead the caucus as co-chairs through 2022 as its ranks swell to 25 members. Congressmen Jim Baird (R-IN-04) and Salud Carbajal (D-CA-24) will serve as vice-chairs.

“Serving this country in the military gives you the skills to work as a team with Americans of different backgrounds and beliefs, for a cause greater than yourself,” said co-chairs Van Taylor and Jared Golden. “As co-chairs of the For Country Caucus, we’re honored to lead this bipartisan group of Veterans as we continue to build on the foundation that’s been laid over the past two years. The mission of this caucus — to set aside political differences in the pursuit of policies that will benefit the country — has never been more important, and together we can set that example in Congress.” 

The For Country Caucus is a group of principled military Veteran members who strive to create a Congress that is less polarized, more efficient, and is trusted by Americans. Together, they share a vision of a Congress that is strategic in purpose, focused on action, and where elected officials put our country first. Members of the For Country Caucus seek a Congress where members serve with integrity, civility, and courage.

Members of the 117th Congress For Country Caucus include Representatives Jason Crow (D-CO-06), Don Bacon (R-NE-02), Chrissy Houlahan (D-PA-06), Jack Bergman (R-MI-01), Scott Franklin (R-FL-15), Kai Kahele (D-HI-02), Mike Gallagher (R-WI-08), Mike Garcia (R-CA-25), Conor Lamb (D-PA-17), Tony Gonzales (R-TX-23), Adam Kinzinger (R-IL-16), Elaine Luria (D-VA-02), Brian Mast (R-FL-18), Peter Meijer (R-MI-03), Seth Moulton (D-MA-06), Mariannette Miller Meeks (R-IA-02), Jimmy Panetta (D-CA-20), August Pfluger (R-TX-11), Mikie Sherrill (D-NJ-11), Greg Steube (R-FL-17), and Michael Waltz (R-FL-06).

In the 116th Congress, the For Country Caucus built a strong track record and got results. The caucus and its members successfully worked to pass a number of national service-oriented provisions into law, including: 

  • Fallen Heroes Family Travel Act (H.R. 3065): Authorized reimbursement to Gold Star families for the costs of transporting fallen servicemembers’ remains to a national cemetery (Became law in FY20 NDAA)
  • Better Military Housing Act (H.R. 2811): Established a tenant “bill of rights” and sets minimum acceptable livability standards for military personnel and their families (Became law in FY20 NDAA)
  • Widow’s Tax Repeal (H.R. 553): Phased out the Widow’s Tax (Became Law in FY20 NDAA)
  • Afghan Allies Protection Act (H.R. 2796): Authorized 4,000 additional visas for Afghan allies and extended the application period to 2021 (Became law in FY20 NDAA)
  • Full Military Honors Act (H.R. 1019): Authorized full military honors for Veterans who were awarded the Medal of Honor or prisoner-of-war medal (Became law in FY20 NDAA)
  • Childcare Resources for Surviving Family Members: Expanded financial assistance to civilian providers of childcare services for Gold Star families (Became law in FY20 NDAA)
  • Meetings of Service Chiefs and Surviving Families: Enacted a requirement for senior military officials to meet with survivors of deceased service members to receive feedback on issues affecting survivors (Became law in FY20 NDAA)
  • National Suicide Hotline Designation Act (H.R. 4194): Designated 9-8-8 as the universal telephone number for a national suicide prevention and mental health crisis hotline (Became Law)
  • National Cyber Director Act (H.R. 7331): Established the office of the National Cyber Director within the Executive Office of the President (Became law in FY21 NDAA)
  • Gold Star Families Park Pass Act (H.R. 5998): Made the National Parks and Federal Recreational Land Pass free to members of Gold Star families (Became law in FY21 NDAA)
  • Legal Services for Homeless Veterans Act (H.R. 3749): Established grants for entities that provide legal services for homeless Veterans (Became law in H.R. 7105)

Saturday, February 27, 2021

President Biden Signs Executive Orders on the Economy

President Biden discusses the executive orders recently issued. The orders focus around ensuring our supply chains are oriented toward capacity building. Cyber security and climate change were also part of his agenda. Attracting international and domestic interest in investment what will be needed to rebuild the country. New opportunities for businesses and economic depressed areas. There is also a need to foster new research in innovation and university partnerships. He wants American products to be sold overseas and will push domestic manufacturing production. 

Semi conductors build computer chips impact just about everything in our country. If our nation is to master the Information Age and the Digital Economy certain technologies should be brought in house so information can be protected and innovative development secured. Having the resources and knowledge we rely on developed overseas often opens those developments to corporate and government espionage. Government level espionage mixed with technological advanced adversaries would be difficult to overcome without renewed focus on innovative development. 

The play is to complete a 100 day fast reviews of:

-Semi conductors
-Rare earth and materials
-Pharmaceuticals 
-Advanced Batteries

What you can see is a testing and review of the supply chains throughout the nation to understand their capacity, strengths and weaknesses. Once those weaknesses are discovered those would be the first industries to push for new innovative development practices. As those industries go online and the supply chain innovates and integrates it will develop (efficiency and effectiveness) in a way that leads to cross chain development. With luck, what we may find is a transformation across societal platforms that leads to increased prosperity on multiple fronts. Industries in this scenario would reach out in new directions and capitalizing on new technologies built in the U.S. up and down each of the supply chains (i.e. robot fish farming, aerospace metals, new drugs, new military equipment, etc...). 

A couple of key questions I would keep in mind are....
1. Can targeted capacity building on specific supply chains and sectors lead to increased transactions across industries?

2. If  enhanced transactions improve innovation and wealth, would it also spark whole new industries?

3. Assuming that 1 and 2 are correct, can we localize that policy for cities/areas (i.e. Delta County MI) to reconnect them to the global supply chain and industries through innovative development?

You can view information on what the Executive Branch does and why executive orders are used by administrative adjustments in resources and activities HERE. Eventually they will be placed in the Federal Registry. You can read the actual Executive Order on America's Supply Chains. You may also want to read about the meeting with Automakers and Labor Leaders (Yaaa Detroit! My old stomping ground πŸ™Œ). The meeting focused on many of these same topics.

Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

     Section 1.  Policy.  The United States needs resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains to ensure our economic prosperity and national security.  Pandemics and other biological threats, cyber-attacks, climate shocks and extreme weather events, terrorist attacks, geopolitical and economic competition, and other conditions can reduce critical manufacturing capacity and the availability and integrity of critical goods, products, and services.  Resilient American supply chains will revitalize and rebuild domestic manufacturing capacity, maintain America’s competitive edge in research and development, and create well-paying jobs.  They will also support small businesses, promote prosperity, advance the fight against climate change, and encourage economic growth in communities of color and economically distressed areas.  
     More resilient supply chains are secure and diverse — facilitating greater domestic production, a range of supply, built-in redundancies, adequate stockpiles, safe and secure digital networks, and a world-class American manufacturing base and workforce.  Moreover, close cooperation on resilient supply chains with allies and partners who share our values will foster collective economic and national security and strengthen the capacity to respond to international disasters and emergencies.
     Therefore, it is the policy of my Administration to strengthen the resilience of America’s supply chains.
     Sec. 2.  Coordination.  The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (APEP) shall coordinate the executive branch actions necessary to implement this order through the interagency process identified in National Security Memorandum 2 of February 4, 2021 (Renewing the National Security Council System).  In implementing this order, the heads of agencies should, as appropriate, consult outside stakeholders — such as those in industry, academia, non-governmental organizations, communities, labor unions, and State, local, and Tribal governments — in order to fulfill the policy identified in section 1 of this order.
     Sec. 3.  100-Day Supply Chain Review.  (a)  To advance the policy described in section 1 of this order, the APNSA and the APEP, in coordination with the heads of appropriate agencies, as defined in section 6(a) of this order, shall complete a review of supply chain risks, as outlined in subsection (b) of this section, within 100 days of the date of this order.
     (b)  Within 100 days of the date of this order, the specified heads of agencies shall submit the following reports to the President, through the APNSA and the APEP:
          (i)    The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report identifying risks in the semiconductor manufacturing and advanced packaging supply chains and policy recommendations to address these risks.  The report shall include the items described in section 4(c) of this order.
          (ii)   The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report identifying risks in the supply chain for high-capacity batteries, including electric-vehicle batteries, and policy recommendations to address these risks.  The report shall include the items described in section 4(c) of this order.
          (iii)  The Secretary of Defense (as the National Defense Stockpile Manager), in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report identifying risks in the supply chain for critical minerals and other identified strategic materials, including rare earth elements (as determined by the Secretary of Defense), and policy recommendations to address these risks.  The report shall also describe and update work done pursuant to Executive Order 13953 of September 30, 2020 (Addressing the Threat to the Domestic Supply Chain From Reliance on Critical Minerals From Foreign Adversaries and Supporting the Domestic Mining and Processing Industries).  The report shall include the items described in section 4(c) of this order.
          (iv)   The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report identifying risks in the supply chain for pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients and policy recommendations to address these risks.  The report shall complement the ongoing work to secure the supply chains of critical items needed to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, including personal protective equipment, conducted pursuant to Executive Order 14001 of January 21, 2021 (A Sustainable Public Health Supply Chain).  The report shall include the items described in section 4(c) of this order.
     (c)  The APNSA and the APEP shall review the reports required under subsection (b) of this section and shall submit the reports to the President in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
     (d)  The APNSA and the APEP shall include a cover memorandum to the set of reports submitted pursuant to this section, summarizing the reports’ findings and making any additional overall recommendations for addressing the risks to America’s supply chains, including the supply chains for the products identified in subsection (b) of this section.
     Sec. 4.  Sectoral Supply Chain Assessments.  (a)  Within 1 year of the date of this order, the specified heads of agencies shall submit the following reports to the President, through the APNSA and the APEP:
          (i)    The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the defense industrial base that updates the report provided pursuant to Executive Order 13806 of July 21, 2017 (Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States), and builds on the Annual Industrial Capabilities Report mandated by the Congress pursuant to section 2504 of title 10, United States Code.  The report shall identify areas where civilian supply chains are dependent upon competitor nations, as determined by the Secretary of Defense.
          (ii)   The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the public health and biological preparedness industrial base (as determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services).  The report shall complement the work conducted pursuant to section 4 of Executive Order 14001.
          (iii)  The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for critical sectors and subsectors of the information and communications technology (ICT) industrial base (as determined by the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security), including the industrial base for the development of ICT software, data, and associated services. 
          (iv)   The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the energy sector industrial base (as determined by the Secretary of Energy).
          (v)    The Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the transportation industrial base (as determined by the Secretary of Transportation).
          (vi)   The Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the production of agricultural commodities and food products.
     (b)  The APNSA and the APEP shall, as appropriate and in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, recommend adjustments to the scope for each industrial base assessment, including digital networks, services, assets, and data (“digital products”), goods, services, and materials that are relevant within more than one defined industrial base, and add new assessments, as appropriate, for goods and materials not included in the above industrial base assessments.
     (c)  Each report submitted under subsection (a) of this section shall include a review of:
          (i)     the critical goods and materials, as defined in section 6(b) of this order, underlying the supply chain in question;
          (ii)    other essential goods and materials, as defined in section 6(d) of this order, underlying the supply chain in question, including digital products;
          (iii)   the manufacturing or other capabilities necessary to produce the materials identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section, including emerging capabilities;
          (iv)    the defense, intelligence, cyber, homeland security, health, climate, environmental, natural, market, economic, geopolitical, human-rights or forced-labor risks or other contingencies that may disrupt, strain, compromise, or eliminate the supply chain — including risks posed by supply chains’ reliance on digital products that may be vulnerable to failures or exploitation, and risks resulting from the elimination of, or failure to develop domestically, the capabilities identified in subsection (c)(iii) of this section — and that are sufficiently likely to arise so as to require reasonable preparation for their occurrence;
          (v)     the resilience and capacity of American manufacturing supply chains and the industrial and agricultural base — whether civilian or defense — of the United States to support national and economic security, emergency preparedness, and the policy identified in section 1 of this order, in the event any of the contingencies identified in subsection (c)(iv) of this section occurs, including an assessment of:
               (A)  the manufacturing or other needed capacities of the United States, including the ability to modernize to meet future needs;
               (B)  gaps in domestic manufacturing capabilities, including nonexistent, extinct, threatened, or single-point-of-failure capabilities;
               (C)  supply chains with a single point of failure, single or dual suppliers, or limited resilience, especially for subcontractors, as defined by section 44.101 of title 48, Code of Federal Regulations (Federal Acquisition Regulation);
               (D)  the location of key manufacturing and production assets, with any significant risks identified in subsection (c)(iv) of this section posed by the assets’ physical location;
               (E)  exclusive or dominant supply of critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, as identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section, by or through nations that are, or are likely to become, unfriendly or unstable;
               (F)  the availability of substitutes or alternative sources for critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, as identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section;
               (G)  current domestic education and manufacturing workforce skills for the relevant sector and identified gaps, opportunities, and potential best practices in meeting the future workforce needs for the relevant sector;
               (H)  the need for research and development capacity to sustain leadership in the development of critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, as identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section;
               (I)  the role of transportation systems in supporting existing supply chains and risks associated with those transportation systems; and
               (J)  the risks posed by climate change to the availability, production, or transportation of critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, as identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section.
          (vi)    allied and partner actions, including whether United States allies and partners have also identified and prioritized the critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section, and possible avenues for international engagement.  In assessing these allied and partner actions, the heads of agencies shall consult with the Secretary of State;
          (vii)   the primary causes of risks for any aspect of the relevant industrial base and supply chains assessed as vulnerable pursuant to subsection (c)(v) of this section;
          (viii)  a prioritization of the critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, including digital products, identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section for the purpose of identifying options and policy recommendations.  The prioritization shall be based on statutory or regulatory requirements; importance to national security, emergency preparedness, and the policy set forth in section 1 of this order; and the review conducted pursuant to subsection (c)(v) of this section;
          (ix)    specific policy recommendations for ensuring a resilient supply chain for the sector.  Such recommendations may include sustainably reshoring supply chains and developing domestic supplies, cooperating with allies and partners to identify alternative supply chains, building redundancy into domestic supply chains, ensuring and enlarging stockpiles, developing workforce capabilities, enhancing access to financing, expanding research and development to broaden supply chains, addressing risks due to vulnerabilities in digital products relied on by supply chains, addressing risks posed by climate change, and any other recommendations;
          (x)     any executive, legislative, regulatory, and policy changes and any other actions to strengthen the capabilities identified in subsection (c)(iii) of this section, and to prevent, avoid, or prepare for any of the contingencies identified in subsection (c)(iv) of this section; and
          (xi)    proposals for improving the Government-wide effort to strengthen supply chains, including proposals for coordinating actions required under this order with ongoing efforts that could be considered duplicative of the work of this order or with existing Government mechanisms that could be used to implement this order in a more effective manner.
     (d)  The APNSA and the APEP shall review the reports required under subsection (a) of this section and shall submit the reports to the President in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
     Sec. 5.  General Review and Recommendations.  As soon as practicable following the submission of the reports required under section 4 of this order, the APNSA and the APEP, in coordination with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall provide to the President one or more reports reviewing the actions taken over the previous year and making recommendations concerning:
     (a)  steps to strengthen the resilience of America’s supply chains;
     (b)  reforms needed to make supply chain analyses and actions more effective, including statutory, regulatory, procedural, and institutional design changes.  The report shall include recommendations on whether additional offices, personnel, resources, statistical data, or authorities are needed;
     (c)  establishment of a quadrennial supply chain review, including processes and timelines regarding ongoing data gathering and supply chain monitoring;
     (d)  diplomatic, economic, security, trade policy, informational, and other actions that can successfully engage allies and partners to strengthen supply chains jointly or in coordination;
     (e)  insulating supply chain analyses and actions from conflicts of interest, corruption, or the appearance of impropriety, to ensure integrity and public confidence in supply chain analyses;
     (f)  reforms to domestic and international trade rules and agreements needed to support supply chain resilience, security, diversity, and strength;
     (g)  education and workforce reforms needed to strengthen the domestic industrial base;
     (h)  steps to ensure that the Government’s supply chain policy supports small businesses, prevents monopolization, considers climate and other environmental impacts, encourages economic growth in communities of color and economically distressed areas, and ensures geographic dispersal of economic activity across all regions of the United States; and
     (i)  Federal incentives and any amendments to Federal procurement regulations that may be necessary to attract and retain investments in critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, as defined in sections 6(b) and 6(d) of this order, including any new programs that could encourage both domestic and foreign investment in critical goods and materials.
     Sec. 6.  Definitions.  For purposes of this order:
     (a)  “Agency” means any authority of the United States that is an “agency” under 44 U.S.C. 3502(1), other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5).  “Agency” also means any component of the Executive Office of the President. 
     (b)  “Critical goods and materials” means goods and raw materials currently defined under statute or regulation as “critical” materials, technologies, or infrastructure.
     (c)  “Critical minerals” has the meaning given to that term in Executive Order 13953 of September 30, 2020 (Addressing the Threat to the Domestic Supply Chain From Reliance on Critical Minerals From Foreign Adversaries and Supporting the Domestic Mining and Processing Industries).
     (d)  “Other essential goods and materials” means goods and materials that are essential to national and economic security, emergency preparedness, or to advance the policy set forth in section 1 of this order, but not included within the definition of “critical goods and materials.”
     (e)  “Supply chain,” when used with reference to minerals, includes the exploration, mining, concentration, separation, alloying, recycling, and reprocessing of minerals.
     Sec. 7.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect
          (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
          (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
     (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
     (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

Wednesday, February 24, 2021

New Legislation to Name the Gaylord VA Community Based Outreach Clinic (CBOC) to Honor Veteran Steve Andrews

The life we build for ourselves today is built off of the hard work and sacrifice of those who served their country. There are many ways to serve one's nation of which the military is one. You will notice the military members often come with a deep seated need to help the communities thrive. Honoring those sacrifices should serve as a reminder and example to others the ways in which they may serve their communities as well. We should seek to lead by example!

The following was taken from Bergman press release on email..... 


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: 
February 24, 2021
CONTACT:
James Hogge 231-944-7633
Bergman Introduces Legislation to Name New Gaylord VA Clinic in Honor of Navy Corpsman Steve Andrews
Washington - Today, Rep. Jack Bergman introduced legislation to name the new Gaylord VA Community Based Outreach Clinic (CBOC) in honor of the late Steve Andrews. Andrews was a beloved member of the Gaylord community and a state legislator representing the 106th District, having previously served our Nation overseas at the U.S. Navy Hospital in Guam and as a medic in the 1st Marine Division and Marine 1st Force Reconnaissance Company in Vietnam.

Rep. Bergman stated, "Corpsman Steve Andrews lived a life dedicated to service and to his fellow countrymen. It is my hope that our plan to designate the new CBOC in Gaylord – a place where we heal those who made incredible sacrifices for our Nation-- in his honor will be a small tribute to his legacy of service to our Northern Michigan community and the United States.”

Steve Andrews entered the U.S. Navy in 1967 as a Hospital Corpsman then subsequently served at the U.S. Naval Hospital on Guam and as a medic with the 1st Marine Division and Marine 1st Force Reconnaissance Company in Vietnam. For his actions in combat in Vietnam and for saving the lives of countless Marines, he was awarded the Navy Commendation Medal and received the Purple Heart.

Following his military service, Steve worked as an entrepreneur and was later elected to the Michigan House of Representatives, representing Northern Michigan's 106th District. Steve served Northern Michigan for two terms and then turned his efforts to building his family and business. Steve coached and was a father figure to thousands of kids in baseball, football and more. He additionally served on the board of trustees of North Central Michigan College and was president of the Petoskey Regional Chamber of Commerce. 

The new Gaylord VA Community Based Outpatient Clinic (CBOC) located at 2782 S. Otsego Avenue, officially opened its doors on Monday, August 24, 2020. The 18,362 square foot CBOC provides outpatient primary care, mental health, telehealth, laboratory services, home based primary care, women’s health and whole health.

bergman.house.gov

Tuesday, February 23, 2021

Federal Reserve Jerome Powell Discusses Treasury Yields, SLR Exclusion, and Plans on Economic Recovery

 Federal Reserve Jerome Powell discusses bond yields on economy recovering from COVID slowdowns. 

1.)  Fed to announce SLR Exclusion: Regulatory Capital Rule: Temporary Exclusion of U.S. Treasury Securities and Deposits at Federal Reserve Banks From the Supplementary Leverage Ratio for Depository Institutions

2.) Increase in Treasury Yields in Broader Economy: Fed looks at financial conditions and they believe that yields are moving up because it is a statement of confidence on the recovery of the economy.

3. Message Jerome Powell wants to send? Unemployment is like 20% for lower income levels so the Fed will be flexible in its choices as information comes in. Expect advanced warnings for monetary changes.

Venture Capital Collaboration Determines Market Emergence Strategies (Delta County as an Example)

Investment interest is like the clang of champagne glasses πŸ₯‚to the entrepreneurial class. "What is an idea if there is no market demand?" they may have learned from hard years of torturous failure (Sounds brutal 😨). Entrepreneurs see problems while Venture Capitalists (VC) see marketable solutions. The dream and the dollars makes a marriage of convenience between the two.  With financial mentorship, start-ups have a chance to be acquired by a parent companies that are in need innovative products and ideas. Those who think they "got what it takes" to build their own empires can always throw their javelins into IPO ring.


Prior research indicates start-ups do well when they work within an innovative environment with other like minded people. What we don't know is how collaborating among venture-capitalists (VC) impacts the outcome of start-ups as they emerge on the global market. Investment interest will form the structure of the blossom. 

The researchers analyzed 11,000 U.S. start-ups on Crunchbase backed by venture-capital (VC) firms to determine how they are related IPO (Wang, Pahnke & McDonald, 2021). What they found was... 

1. Jointly funded start-ups by knowledgeable VC (focused) are more likely to exit by acquisition (bought out by the bigger firm). 

2. Start Ups funded by less knowledgeable VCs are likely to be IPOs.

Why are investment strategies important to government? When these start-ups are purposeful (tied to an industry) and connect with investors (interested sources of capital) they have opportunities for faster growth which in turn impacts things like jobs, taxes, opportunities, etc... A few examples of what might apply hypothetically to a place like Delta County:

1.) Space/Military Industry: Utilizing existing( and attracting new) small batch SME manufacturers for specialized production for key clients (skills will spill over to other SME in the area). A specialized cluster forms within a larger cluster.

2. Outdoor Manufacturing: Outdoor manufacturers are looking for new ideas and are willing to invest in micro tourist manufacturers that have unique products (i.e. snow shoes, arrows, skis, bikes, etc..). Small manufacturing also brings tourists which feeds ideas and brand awareness.

3. A Relationship?: Start-ups feed innovation and local skills in a way that leads to improved development in multiple industries (i.e. outdoor gear, military equipment, custom space equipment/parts, metals research, etc...) When industries develop together they build off of each other's strengths, ideas, and resources.

The research provides some justification that encouraging investments will have an impact on the type of businesses that grow within the area. In this example, focused investors (knowledgeable) in Delta County will be looking at specific products while unfocused venture capitalists will be seeking profitability through IPO. The spill over between different types of businesses can enhance both of them through focusing on specific products for investment and allowing related businesses to find related market needs (variability that keeps a cluster adjusting).

{I'm working on a theoretical concept using Delta County MI as an example to attract entrepreneurs to utilize local facilities (SME and/or tourism/outdoor related micro manufacturing), attract venture capital investors, and bring those start-ups to market competitiveness (value for acquisition, IPO, private venture on s, m, l batch production). The model seeks to foster quick development through innovative clustering that creates a wider utility of capital (all kinds) to enhance (and create new) export oriented industries. ...(or something like that πŸ€”πŸ‘€).HERE.}

Wang, D., Pahnke, E. & McDonald, R. (January 20, 2021). The Past Is Prologue? Venture-Capital Syndicates’ Collaborative Experience and Start-Up Exits. Academy of Management Journal-Press. Retreived 02-21-21 https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2019.1312

Capital Riots Senate Hearing Live-The Need to Update Data Infrastructure?

The Senate Hearing will provide greater insight into the situation that emerged on January 6th, 2021 at the capital and what other factors may be associated with the sacking of one of the securest buildings in the world. Leading up to this situation you could hear the rhetoric developing into a crescendo between both parties; the vote becoming a battle line. What might have caught everyone off guard is how easy it was for a single spark to ignite the kindling that burst into violence. Avoiding that in the future will require Republican (I'm assuming it doesn't need to be broken into Trump and "Old Guard" Republicans) and Democrat action.

As a nation we should keep a watchful eye out for hate behavior so that it doesn't light a match to a much more destructive fire that engulfs the whole house. This is one of the many reasons why its important to adjust state laws to detect and redirect early signs of hate behavior before people coordinate. Michigan has an opportunity to lead the charge if lawmakers find the adjustments important (Its our elected officials responsibility to pass laws that they feel are in the best interest of their state and country). 

I also wonder if there are international actors involved that have the historical skills and the social media ability to spark insurrections in other countries? (πŸ‘€πŸ€” 😬) Also one might want to know if there was any collusion of stolen information from multiple agents/actors filming with their cell phones documents as they ransacked offices trying to find "proof" of wrongdoing. It almost looks like a strategy to broadcast, capture and reorganize.  American data is way too exposed to foreign entities and smart people who know how to put that data into a framework/method that risks long term national security. Updating our digital infrastructure to better secure data could help maintain national competitiveness on multiple economic, security, and social fronts.